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Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International
Corona Resources Ltd.: Implications
for the Minerals Industry In Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
Exploratory and development work in the natural resources
industry usually involves confidential information' and generally
mining companies take measures to insure that such information
is not revealed to competitors. 2 However, situations routinely
arise in which a relatively small company possessing valuable
geologic information lacks sufficient financial resources to act
on the information. 3 In order to proceed with a project, many
times a small company must disclose portions of information to
attract investors.' This, in turn, can put smaller companies in a
very vulnerable position.
5
On August 11, 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada decided
the case of Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources
Ltd. (Lac).6 The Court held that Lac breached an obligation of
confidentiality when it acquired adjoining property based upon
geologic information obtained by it during negotiations for a
joint venture or mining partnership with International Corona
Resources Ltd. (Corona).7 The decision has "engendered much
interest regarding the rights and obligations of parties with re-
spect to trade secrets disclosed during negotiations for the ac-
quisition or development of mineral properties." 8 Moreover, the
' MALEY, HANDBOOK OF MwnRAL LAW 83 (2d ed. 1979).
2 Id.
I Erisman and McCarthy, International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals
Ltd.: Unathorized Use of Trade Secrets Acquired During Failed Negotiations, 9 EAsTERN
MiN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-2 (1988).
4Id.
Id. Erisman and McCarthy point out that often the investors will be "larger
established exploration and development compan[ies] who may very well be ... com-
petitor[sl."
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 574.
'Id. at 576. Subsequent to the outset of litigation, International Corona Resources
Ltd. changed its name to Corona Corporation.
I Erisman and McCarthy, supra note 3, at 1-2.
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case is of great importance for mining industry practices regard-
ing the handling of confidential information in site visits and
negotiations toward the joint development of mineral property.
This Note will review the Lac decision and discuss how
Kentucky courts might resolve the issues of confidentiality and
fiduciary duty between mining companies negotiating a prospec-
tive business relationship. Additionally, the Note will suggest a
policy of business practice for negotiations and appropriate
agreements regarding confidentiality of information revealed
during negotiations.
I. LAC MIERAms LTD. V. INTERNATIONAL CORONA
RESOURCES LTD.
A. The Facts
At the time of negotiations, Corona was a junior mining
company9 and Lac a senior mining company'0 operating a num-
ber of mines.' As of January, 1980, Corona held seventeen
claims comprising an area of approximately 680 acres 2 in the
Hemlo region of northern Ontario." The Williams property
consisting of eleven patented. claims, laid contiguous to the west
side of Corona's property. 4 Another piece of property, known
as the Hughes property, surrounded the Corona property and
all but the north side of the Williams property. 5
In October of 1980, Corona hired a geologist consultant to
thoroughly examine its property.6 The results of the exploration
"led Corona to believe that they had found a sizeable discovery
I Id. at 1-3, n.6 (A junior mining company has been described as one which
"often require[s] public financing to engage in special projects" and "therefore often
makefs] public the results of [its) exploration efforts.").
,0 Id. (A senior mining company is one which "owns one or more properties in
production, has extensive exploration capabilities and is listed on the major stock
exchanges.").
" International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., (Corona 1), 53
O.R.(2d) 737, 740 (1986).
12 Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574,
587.
" For a history of the development of the Hemlo area, see Corona I, 53 O.R.(2d)
at 741-43.
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of gold distributed over a large area trending north and west' ' 7
into the Williams and Hughes properties.
Corona communicated a portion of these results to the Van-
couver Stock Exchange in the form of news releases, and to a
daily Vancouver newsletter, the George Cross News Letter.*s At
the same time, Corona began attempts to acquire the Williams
property. 19
Lac representatives read of the Corona results in the March
20, 1981 issue of the George Cross News Letter.20 On April 6,
Lac arranged a site visit with Corona with a view towards
making some kind of joint arrangement.2 ' The property visit
took place on May 6, at which time Lac geologists were shown
core samples, sections, logs with assay results added, and a map
revealing staking of claims in the area.? Lac representatives
discussed the theory of the geology with Corona's geologist, and
learned that the mineralized zone continued to the west on the
adjoining Williams property, and that Corona was attempting
to acquire the Williams property.? At the conclusion of the May
6 site visit, the two parties arranged a meeting for May 8, in
Toronto, at Lac's headquarters.Y
At the May 8th meeting, Lac and Corona representatives
once again discussed the geology of the various tracts of land.
They also discussed the terms of a possible agreement to develop
the area as a joint venture. 2s The Williams and the Hughes
properties were also discussed on May 8, however, once again,
neither party mentioned confidentiality.26
The next significant meeting between Lac and Corona oc-
curred on June 30, 1981. At this meeting, Corona made a full
"Erisman and McCarthy, supra note 3, at 1-4.
Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 587 (The results were published in an attempt to attract
investors).
19 Id. at 587-8.
20 Id. at 588.
21 Corona 1, 53 O.R.(2d) at 745 (Whether Lac intended to negotiate a joint venture
or partnership at this point is not clear).
2 Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 588.
0 Id. at 589 (The trial judge "found as a fact that there were no discussions
regarding confidentiality during the May 6 property visit except in connection with an
unrelated matter."). See also Corona I, 53 O.R.(2d) at 746.
2, Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 589.
0 Corona 1, 53 O.R.(2d) at 749.
6 Id.
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presentation of its results to date 7 and again made mention of
its efforts to acquire the Williams property. 28 Further discussions
and an exchange of joint venture ideas followed, with Lac prom-
ising -to submit a proposal to Corona within three weeks. 29
On July 3, just three days after hearing Corona's first full
presentation, Lac located the owner of the Williams property
and made an offer to purchase the property.30 At that time the
owner also was considering Corona's offer which had been made
on June 8, 1981. 31 On July 21, Corona again contacted the
owner of the Williams property and was informed of the com-
peting offer. 32 However, the identity of the competitor was not
disclosed. Although Corona prepared another offer, which it
delivered on July 27, 33 the owner of the Williams property ac-
cepted Lac's offer on July 28. Lac signed a formal agreement
with the Williams property owner on August 25, 1981 .34 Upon
discovering that Lac had successfully defeated Corona's attempt
to purchase the property, Corona commenced legal proceedings
against Lac on the theories of "contract, breach of confidence,
and breach of fiduciary duty."" Undaunted by these legal de-
velopments, Lac proceeded to develop a very profitable gold
mine on the Williams property which became the largest gold
mine in Canada.
36
Corona's claims succeeded during the initial phase of litiga-
tion. The trial court found that Lac had breached a duty of
confidence to Corona by misusing the confidential information
supplied by Corona under circumstances which'imposed an ob-
ligation of confidence.3 7 Additionally, the trial court found Lac
in breach of fiduciary duty, holding that Lac and Corona owed
Id. at 753 (The results presented included a detailed drill plan, "'sections, general
geology, longitudinal presentation location potential, etc.'. . . A copy of all of the
material was left with Lac at the conclusion of the meeting.").
n Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 592.
-Id. According to a Corona representative, "no one from Lac ever told him that
they would not acquire the Williams property and Lac was never told that the infor-
mation given to it was private privileged, or confidential."
30 Id.
1 Id. (Corona's oral offer of June 8 was followed by a written offer).
32 Id.
3 Id. at 592-93 (Corona was apprised of Lac's competing bid on July 23.).
34 Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 593.
33 Id.
11 See Hemlo: A North American Gold Success Story, ENGIN. & MmaNq J. 10
(June 1987).
17 Corona 1. 53 O.R.(2d) at 775-76.
[VOL. 6:69
1990-91] CONFMENTLALTY IN MINNo NEGOTIATIONS
each other a duty not to act to the detriment of the other during
their negotiations toward a joint venture. 8 The trial court then
ordered Lac to transfer the property to Corona, subject to the
payment of development costs by Corona.3 9 On appeal, the
Ontario Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's judgment,
relying primarily on fiduciary duty as the source of liability.4
B. The Holding of the Supreme Court of Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court affirmed the holding but on
somewhat different grounds from the lower courts. The Court
unanimously agreed to impose liability on the grounds of breach
of confidence .4  However a majority of the Court held that a
constructive trust in favor of Corona was the proper remedy for
the breach.4 2 A different majority refused to find a breach of
fiduciary duty by Lac. 43 A detailed look at each of these elements
of the Canadian Supreme Court's holding follows.
1. Breach of Confidence
In finding that Lac breached a duty of confidence to Corona,
the Court listed three elements which must be established to
impose liability: "[1] That the information conveyed was con-
fidential; [2] that it was communicated in confidence; and, [3]
that it was misused by the party to whom it was communi-
cated."4
The Court had little difficulty in applying the first two
elements to Lac and Corona. Although the record showed that
all of the information that Lac relied on was not confidential,
45
" Id. at 777.
" Id. at 789.
40 International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Minerals Ltd., 62 O.R.(2d) 1, 59 (1988)
("In our view, once the trial judge had found that a fiduciary relationship existed
between the parties and that Lac breached its fiduciary obligation by purchasing the
Williams property, it was open for him to hold that Lac was a constructive trustee for
Corona for the Williams property").
4' See infra text accompanying notes 44-49.
See infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 50-59.
- Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 576.
4' See supra text accompanying note 18. See also Corona I, 53 O.R.(2d) at 751
(Throughout the negotiations Corona openly continued to seek alternative financing.
Corona released results on May 27 and June 2 to the Vancouver Stock Exchange which
were ultimately published in the George Cross News Letter.).
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the site visit and discussions with Corona provided a "spring
board" that led to Lac's acquisition of the Williams property.4
6
The Court noted that "Corona had communicated private, un-
published information... under circumstances giving rise to an
obligation of confidence." 47
Speaking to the third element, the Court held that Lac acted
to Corona's detriment when it used the confidential information
to acquire the Williams property.4'8 As a result of the negotia-
tions, "Lac was uniquely disabled from pursuing property in
the area for a period of time. ... "49
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
While the Court rendered a unanimous decision regarding
breach of confidence, the issue of breach of fiduciary duty
divided the justices. 50 Justice Sopinka, for the majority, took a
restrictive view of fiduciary obligation, describing it "a blunt
tool of equity," rarely if ever needed in arm's length negotia-
tions.5 ' In describing relationships imposing fiduciary obliga-
tions, Sopinka noted three general characteristics:
1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion
or power;
2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or dis-
cretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical inter-
ests; and,
3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy
of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
52
The majority then held that the indispensable feature of
vulnerability or dependency of the beneficiary on the fiduciary
46 Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 576.
"7 Id. (The Court seemed to be impressed by the fact that the two companies were
diligently working toward an agreement).
" Id. at 577 (The Court noted that Corona would have acquired the Williams
property but for Lac's misuse of confidential information).
, Id. The Court noted Lac could have negotiated a relationship with Corona
regarding disclosure of confidential information or it could have pursued property in
the area based on publicly available knowledge. Id.
- Justices Sopinka, McIntyre, and Lamer found no fiduciary duty existed between
the two parties. On the other hand, Justices La Forest and Wilson found, for different
reasons, that a fiduciary duty did exist. See Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 578, 580.
Id. at 595 (Sopinka, J. dissenting in part).
Id. at 599 (presence of all elements will not invariably identify the existence of
a fiduciary relationship).
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did not exist between Lac and Corona. 3 Sopinka stated that to
the extent Corona was vulnerable to Lac, "this dependency was
gratuitously incurred.' '
In contrast, the minority, made up of Justices La Forest and
Wilson, concluded that vulnerability should not be the touch-
stone for the imposition of a fiduciary relationship." One of the
more interesting aspects of the minority's opinion was its em-
phasis on industry practice. While experts in the case failed to
give evidence of the existence of fiduciary duties, they did give
evidence of an industry practice not to act to the other's detri-
ment during serious negotiations.s In the minority's view, the
industry practice allowed Corona to rely on Lac to observe the
implied duties.
7
In response to the majority's fear that introducing fiduciary
obligations to the commercial law setting would "result in ad
hoc morality determining the rules of commercial conduct," 5 8
La Forest and Wilson argued that fiduciary obligations in com-
mercial law settings did not provide uncertainty to the rules of
commercial conduct.5 9
3. The Remedy
After holding Lac liable for breach of confidence the Court
turned to the issue of an appropriate remedy. Justice La Forest,
writing for the majority, determined that under the circum-
stances, a constructive trust would most fully compensate Co-
rona.60
The justices recognized some disagreement among themselves
as to circumstances under which a constructive trust should be
imposed.6' However, the Court reached a consensus in applying
13 Id. at 601. Sopinka opined that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred
by not giving enough weight to the "essential ingredient of dependency or vulnerability"
and too much weight to factors such as the fact that Lac sought .out Corona, that
Corona had divulged confidential information to Lac, that the parties were negotiating
towards a common objective, and that industry practice supported the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. Id.
1" Id. at 607 (intimating that Corona was remiss for not having protected itself
with a confidentiality agreement before showing its information to Lac officials).
11 See Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 578.




See Lac, 2 S.C.R. at 579.
61 Id.
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a two step analysis. The first step involved determining whether
a claim for unjust enrichment was established. 62 Where such a
claim was established, the Court next evaluated whether in the
circumstances a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy
to redress that unjust enrichment. 63 The Court emphasized that
no finding of a special relationship between the parties is a
prerequisite to the imposition of a constructive trust. In addition,
a pre-existing property right need not necessarily exist before a
constructive trust is ordered."
Several factors influenced the Canadian Supreme Court to
order a constructive trust in favor of Corona. First, the Court
noted the uniqueness of the Williams property. Second, it found
that but for Lac's breach of confidence Corona would have
acquired the property. Finally, the virtual impossibility of valu-
ing the Williams property militated in favor of the constructive
trust. 6
II. How WouLD KENTUCKY'S COURTS APPROACH A LAc
SITUATION?
A. Breach of Confidence
The most striking feature of the Lac litigation is the fact
that the negotiations between Lac and Corona never culminated
in a recognizable contractual relationship.66 Because of this,
details of meetings, discussions, and correspondence between
them took on added evidentiary value. The creation of a con-
tractual relationship is a pivotal point upon which Kentucky
courts have imposed a duty of confidentiality. 67
In O'Bryan v. Bickett," Kentucky's highest Court stated that





- Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574,
575 (Lac).
67 O'Bryan v. Bickett, 419 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1967) (action to require purchaser of
timberland to convey one-half interest in land because purchase violated duty of confi-
dence).
- 419 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1967).
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in land for profit, creates a confidential relationship.... " 69 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court placed great reliance on
the earlier cases of Stewart v. Stovall,70 and Appleby v. Buck.71
From this line of cases it appears that once two parties enter
into an agreement, Kentucky courts have no difficulty imposing
a duty of confidentiality. However, in a situation where no
agreement was reached, such as in Lac, Kentucky courts would
be forced to look to the nature of the relationship.
The nature of a partnership relationship was evaluated in
Stephens v. Stephens.72 There the court held that the relationship
of partners imposes an obligation, of loyalty, integrity, and ut-
most good faith and fairness with regard to partnership affairs.
73
Furthermore, the court held that these obligations begin with
"preliminary negotiations." 74 The Stephens partnership was cre-
ated when two cousins joined together for the purpose of ac-
quiring and developing oil and gas leases. Although there was
no agreement in Stephens, the court held that the two parties
understood that appellant Stephens should procure the leases
and contracts for the sale of the production, and that appellee
Stephens would furnish the operating equipment.75 Both parties
were to share in the profits and losses equally.
76
Before drilling actually commenced, however, appellee Ste-
phens engaged in a contract with his brother in an effort to
avoid certain portions of his agreement with the appellant. The
court held that the appellee's maneuvers constituted a breach of
his obligation to act in the best interest of the partnership or
joint venture.77 The court concluded, "[n]o undue advantage of
69 Id. at 728. The word "agreement" will be used to refer to either a partnership
or joint venture agreement unless otherwise noted. Kentucky law treats the two similarly.
See Drummy v. Stem, 269 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1954).
o 230 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1921) (involving a partnership for the purchase and operation
of a farm).
" 351 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1961) (action for enforcement of an agreement to obtain
certain oil and gas leases).
72 183 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1944) (oil and gas lease case).
Stephens, 183 S.W.2d at 824; see also Stephens v. Allen, 237 S.W.2d 72, 74
(Ky. 1951). A mining partnership has been defined as "an association of joint owners
of mineral property in which, by express stipulation or by implication ... they unite
and agree to develop the premises or operate the lease in order to extract the minerals."
' Stephens, 183 S.W.2d at 824 (emphasis added).
" See id. at 823 (D.C. Stephens, appellee, had bought the equipment, but title to
it was in his brother, Jerry. The understanding provided that the appellee should not
receive any compensation for the use of the equipment.).
76 Id.
" See Id. at 824.
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one [partner] over another by misrepresentation or concealment
will receive the approval of the law."
'78
Applying Kentucky law in the more recent case of Amadio
v. Ingle,79 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
duties owed parties in a proposed joint venture. 80 The court
found that a proposed joint venture imposes upon the parties
thereto "the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern and of
the utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings
with each other.... "" In Amadio, the appellant failed to make
a material disclosure to the appellee, Ingle, and sought to take
advantage of knowledge he was concealing from his proposed
partner.82 Just as the Kentucky court had in Stephens, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals required negotiating parties to deal
with each other in a fair and honest manner.
Although neither the Stephens nor the Amadio courts de-
scribed the duties of negotiating parties to include confidential-
ity, there can be little doubt that "loyalty, integrity, good faith,
and fairness"83 embody the same concerns as a duty of confi-
dence. Given courts' willingness under Kentucky law to impose
a duty of confidentiality on parties to an agreement, it appears
that they would probably extend this duty to negotiating parties.
However, there are difficulties inherent in predicting what a
Kentucky court might do in a Lac situation, primarily because
no Kentucky court has ever specifically defined "confidentiality"
or "breach of confidence." Furthermore, Kentucky has yet to
recognize breach of confidence as an independent cause of ac-
tion. Nevertheless, in a Lac situation, it is possible that Kentucky
M/d.
"216 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1954).
Joint venture in Kentucky has been described as "an informal association of
two or more persons, partaking of the nature of a partnership, usually, but not always,
limited to a single transaction.. ." Eubank v. Richardson, 353 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky.
1962).
" Amadio, 216 F.2d at 23.
92 Id. (case involving a proposed oil and gas agreement).
93 Stephens, 183 S.W.2d 822.
" While Kentucky courts have not defined "confidentiality" or "breach of con-
fidence," they have described "confidential relation." In Security Trust Co. v. Wilson,
210 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ky. 1948), the court described "confidential relation" as existing
"where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good
conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one
reposing confidence."
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courts would recognize a cause of action based upon breach of
confidence on the part of one of the negotiating parties.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
While Kentucky courts would most likely find a breach of
confidence in a Lac situation, it is less clear that they would
find a fiduciary relationship to exist between parties whose re-
lationship is based solely upon negotiations toward a partnership
or joint venture. Kentucky has recognized that "[t[he relation-
ship between joint venturers, like that existing between partners,
is fiduciary in character ... ."81 Additionally, it has been stated
that a fiduciary relationship exists when a party is "under a duty
to act for or give advice for the benefit of another upon matters
within the scope of the relation."" Thus, under Kentucky law
once parties to a partnership or joint venture have entered into
an agreement, a fiduciary relationship results.Y In the foregoing
Kentucky cases, however, the parties had entered into contrac-
tual relations and were not merely negotiating toward a more
definite relationship as were the parties in Lac.8
In Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co.,89 Kentucky's
Court of Appeals explored many familiar forms of fiduciary
relationships including attorney and client, trustee and benefici-
ary, physician and patient, business partners, promoters and a
corporation, and employer and employee.9 It appears that the
Lac situation, one in which two parties are negotiating towards
a more definite relationship, does not seem to fit within this set
of relationships. However, the Henkin court noted, "[t]he [fi-
duciary] relationship is not confined ... to these and similar
situations, for the circumstances which may create a fiduciary
relationship are so varied that it would be unwise to attempt the
formulation of any comprehensive definition that could be uni-
formly applied in every case." 9' Rather than applying an exclu-
sive definition in Kentucky to determine the existence of a
" Jones v. Nickel, 179 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Ky. 1944).
Lappas v. Barker, 375 S.W. 2d 248, 251 (Ky. 1%3).
See id. This is especially true for joint purchases of property.
' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 423.
91 Id.
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fiduciary relationship in a particular case, courts must examine
all the relevant facts. 92
In Henkin, the appellant owned and operated a radio broad-
casting station. As part of the purchase price, Henkin gave a
note for $160,000.00, payable in installments to the grantor. The
grantor offered to accept a discount on the note if Henkin would
pay the note in full. Henkin then applied to the appellee bank
for a loan with which he proposed to pay off the obligation. 9
"In connection with the loan application, Henkin revealed to
the [officers of the] bank the opportunity he had to obtain a
substantial discount from the face value of the note."' ' The
bank subsequently turned down Henkin's application and pur-
chased the Henkin note from the grantor, but failed to reveal
to the grantor that Henkin was attempting to negotiate a loan
with the bank to accomplish the same purpose. 95
In characterizing the relationship between Henkin and the
bank as fiduciary in nature, Kentucky's Court of Appeals stated
that the information given by Henkin to the bank was furnished
in confidence in order to allow the members of the committee
to determine whether the requested loan should be granted.9
The court also found that "the defendant, impliedly at least,
understood the terms upon which the information was given and
voluntarily undertook to comply with those terms."9' After the
court found an implied confidential relationship between the
bank and Henkin, it refused to allow the bank the benefit of its
sharp dealing. In so ruling, the court attempted to uphold "the
public confidence in such institutions."
98
In comparing Henkin to Lac, one can quickly define the
similarities. Both cases involve parties negotiating for an agree-
ment. In both instances, one party confided information in the
other on the assumption that the party so confided in would not
use the information to the provider's detriment. At the same
time, however, some very real differences exist. First, the stature
of the parties involved differs. In Lac, there Was no element of
dependency as both parties were mining companies who were
See id.
93 Henkin, 566 S.W.2d at 422.
1, Id. (Henkin was, then and in the past, a customer of the bank).
" Id.
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well aware of industry practices.Y In Henkin, however, as be-
tween the established lending institution and Henkin there was
clearly an inequity in the stature of the parties. Further, the
Henkin case was ultimately decided on the theory of malicious
interference with known contractual rights of another.' °° The
court noted that they "doubt[ed] that an actual contract existed
between Henkin and [the grantor] for the sale of the note at a
discount."'' Nonetheless, the court determined that the "pur-
chase of the note by the bank interfered with a prospective
advantage of Henkin."' 2
The trend in Kentucky case law remains unclear with regard
to the outer limits in which a fiduciary duty would be*imposed
upon negotiating parties. On one hand, a specific case cannot
be identified in which a Kentucky court has imposed a fiduciary
duty on two parties negotiating toward a partnership or joint
venture. On the other hand, as the Henkin court stated, "[t]he
fact that no case has been found in which relief has been granted
under similar circumstances is not a controlling reason for re-
fusing it; otherwise, the court would often find itself powerless
to grant adequate relief, solely because the precise question had
never arisen."'' 0 3
III. CONFIDENTIALrY AGREEMENTS AS A MEANS OF
PROTECTION IN KENTUCKY
Even after reviewing Kentucky law pertaining to breach of
confidence ,o4 and breach of fiduciary duty, 0 5 the outcome of a
Lac case in Kentucky is uncertain. As indicated in Lac, however,
Corona could have protected itself from such breaches by exe-
cuting a confidentiality agreement with Lac.1'0 Had such an
agreement been undertaken prior to negotiation, Corona and
Lac could have avoided the expense and uncertainty of subse-
quent litigation.
The lack of the element of dependency was the key to the majority's opinion
in Lac. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
I- See Henkin, 566 S.W.2d at 425.
10I Id.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 423.
10, See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
10 See Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R.
574, 608 (Lac).
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In general, a contract which purports to limit, in any way,
the right of parties to work or transact business, whether as to
the character of the work or business, or the manner in which
it shall be done, is a contract in restraint of trade.1°7 For the
most part, such contracts are "regarded with disfavor by the
courts and will be strictly construed so as to limit the restrictions
imposed."'0 To a certain extent, confidentiality agreements could
be regarded as contracts in restraint of trade.
While contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade have been
declared illegal and void in Kentucky,'09 to say that all contracts
in restraint of trade are illegal and void would be a misstatement.
In the case of Vaughan v. General Outdoor Advertising,"10 Ken-
tucky's highest court stated "restrictive covenants in partial re-
straint of trade are enforceable if they are not
unreasonable .... "I"
Thus, it is clear that Kentucky courts do acknowledge the
beneficial use of restrictive covenants in partial restraint of trade.
The test of reasonableness as stated in Johnson v. Stumbo," 2 is
"whether the restraint considering the particular situation and
circumstances, is such only as to afford a fair protection to the
legitimate interests of the party in favor of whom it is given and
not so extensive as to interfere with the interests of the pub-
lic.',, 3
In the recent case of Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Ingram Associates, Inc. , 4 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
upheld a covenant not to compete signed by an employee after
the date of his employment.' 5 In Central Adjustment, the ap-
pellant, Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (Central Adjustment),
a national company providing collection services, sought to en-
force covenants not to compete signed by several of its employ-
ees. The covenants provided that during the term of employment,
and for a period of two years thereafter, employees would not
,07 See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 238 (1963).
10 Id.
1 See, e.g., Jackson v. Sullivan, 124 S.W.2d 1019, 1020 (Ky. 1939) (holding
contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade or tending to destroy or restrict competition
are void as against public policy).
11 352 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1961) (restrictive covenant in lease).
Id. at 564.
126 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1938).
"' Id. at 169.
"4 662 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
-l Id. at 685.
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compete with Central Adjustment either directly or indirectly." 6
Among the specific clauses of the agreements was one restricting
an employee from "divulging or making use of information
about [Central Adjustment]'s business which he has acquired."
'" 7
This particular section of the agreement was in the nature of a
confidentiality agreement.
In upholding the use of the covenant not to compete, the
court noted the highly specialized and competitive nature of
Central Adjustment's business and its interest in preventing em-
ployees from pirating secret information." 8 Indeed, the court
recognized that the use of such covenants was one of the few
protections available to Central Adjustment, and held that the
covenant in question constituted a reasonable restriction of trade
"affording [Central Adjustment] fair protection for its legitimate
business interests."" 9
Synthesizing Kentucky law with regard to covenants in partial
restraint of trade, it appears that such contracts will be upheld,
provided they are limited in scope and duration, and do not
unduly interfere with the interests of the public. For a company
attempting to protect valuable information, such as is often
involved in the mineral industry, a confidentiality agreement
could prove invaluable.
Several guidelines should be followed in order to achieve
optimum protection through the use of such agreements. First,
the agreement should be entered into at the time negotiations
commence. Second, the agreement should specifically and clearly
identify the subject matter to be kept confidential. 2' Third, the
agreement should expressly state that the information conveyed
constitutes confidential information.' 2' Fourth, the agreement
should obligate the recipient of the information not to disclose
the information or use it to the detriment of the party making
the disclosure.'2 Fifth, a time limit should be placed on the
obligation of confidentiality.1'2
"' Id. at 683.
"' Id.
i' Id. at 686.
119 Id.
12 See MacDonald, "Acquisition and Control of Confidential Information", Oil
and Gas Agreements 1-1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn., 1983) (MacDonald suggests that




3 As MacDonald states, it is not always practicable to keep something secret
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Although the use of confidentiality agreements can prove
beneficial, such use is not free of all problems. As one com-
mentator has noted, one problem is the potential "chilling effect
they might have on the free flow of information in the natural
resource industry."' 24 For example, smaller companies might
hesitate to require a confidentiality agreement before disclosing
information regarding a valuable discovery for fear of alienating
potential investors. 25 While this may be a valid concern, it
appears that a confidentiality agreement may simply place in
writing the rights and obligations which courts will impose on
negotiating parties anyway. For this reason, it seems that mining
companies embarking on negotiations regarding confidential in-
formation would be well-advised to enter into a confidentiality
agreement before disclosing confidential information.
CONCLUSION
Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.' 2
has generated great interest among lawyers and non-lawyers alike
in the natural resources industry. "The interdependence and
participation of various unrelated parties from many specialized
disciplines required to explore and develop mineral properties
often necessitates the disclosure of valuable information to a
relatively large. number of people.' '1 27 As a result, breaches of
confidence, conflicts of interest and other ethical conflicts may
arise regarding the use of confidential information.' 2
In Kentucky, a Lac situation would be a case of first im-
pression and the outcome of such a case is now uncertain. To
date, Kentucky has not recognized breach of confidence as an
independent cause of action' 29 and the issue of fiduciary relations
between negotiating parties is unclear. 130 With this in mind,
natural resource companies would be well-advised to enter into
a confidentiality agreement before entering into negotiations for
2 As MacDonald states, it is not always practicable to keep something secret
forever. See id. Furthermore, Kentucky courts would be reluctant to uphold an agreement
unrestricted in duration. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
'2 Erisman and McCarthy, supra note 3, at 1-39.
12 Id.
12 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574.
12 Erisman and McCarthy, supra note 3, at 1-25.
128 Id.
See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
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the joint development of a mineral property, especially where a
company knows the successful negotiation of a partnership or
joint venture agreement will require the disclosure of confidential
information.
William K. Shannon

